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Abstract 
 
The relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and a propensity to engage in 
ideomotor action was investigated in 36 participants from the city of Plymouth, 24 of 
whom were psychology undergraduates from the University of Plymouth. Each 
participant carried out three hypnotic suggestibility tests before carrying out two 
computer-based ideomotor action tasks: a Brass finger-release task and an action-
planning task. It was found that the higher a person’s hypnotic suggestibility, the 
faster they completed ideomotor tasks such as compatible trials in the Brass task (r = 
+.37, n = 27, p < .05) and the inverse action planning trials (r = +.35, n = 27, p <.05). 
This suggests that the reason why some people are more susceptible to hypnotic 
suggestion than others is because they are able to engage more readily in ideomotor 
action.  
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Preface 
This study was completed in keeping with ethical guidelines for psychological 
research involving human participants and received full ethical clearance. The 
researchers involved in this study followed the standard procedure for carrying out 
psychological research and made sure that: all participants were briefed, had signed 
a consent form, were informed of their right to withdraw at any point during or after 
the study, and that they were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment. The 
participants were also given contact details for the researchers as well as the 
principle investigator so that they would be able to raise any questions about the 
research or request their data be removed from the study at any stage after 
completing the experiment. All data were kept completely confidential and no 
information that could be used to identify individual participants was put into the 
write-up of the study. The signed consent forms were placed in a sealed envelope 
following completion of analysis.  
Of the 36 total participants, I personally collected data from 20 and the remaining 16 
were tested by my research partner Natasha Chatfield. Both researchers tested 
participants in the same way and results were compiled following completion of data 
collection.  
 
 
Introduction 
“We think the act and it is done...that is all that introspection tells us on the matter.” 
These words by James (1890) explain in simple terms, what is meant by the phrase 
‘ideomotor action’; that is, the process by which a mental representation of an action 
produces a subsequent muscular reaction that requires little or no effort (Stock & 
Stock, 2004). Ideomotor action occurs when activation of a representation of a 
specific behaviour within the brain leads to a tendency to complete this behaviour 
without an individual necessarily being consciously aware of having done so (Forgas 
& Williams, 2001). Have you ever found that when carrying a full cup of tea you tend 
to spill it no matter how many times you tell yourself “don’t spill this, don’t spill this”? 
This is an example of ideomotor action that we might all be familiar with, whereby the 
dominant recurring thought of spilling the drink leads to the production of actions that 
in turn result in triggering the spill which was wished so desperately to be avoided 
(Wegner, Ansfield & Pilloff, 1998). You could liken this experience to that resulting 
from a hypnotic suggestion in which elicited behaviours are experienced as being 
outside of the executor’s control (Barnier, Dienes, & Mitchel, 2008). 
 
The discovery of the ideomotor effect is attributed to Laycock (1845) who studied 
patients with Hydrophobia (Rabies). After discovering that the mere suggestion of 
having to drink was enough to induce behaviours consistent with those experienced 
when hydrophobic individuals are actually presented with a drink of water (“spasms 
of the respiratory muscles and gasping” (Laycock, 1845)), Laycock concluded that a 
simple thought could be enough to initiate reflexive responses (Laycock, 1845). 
However, as Laycock’s research was limited to work with hydrophobia patients, it is 
difficult to infer from this research alone, whether the theory of ideomotor action can 
be generalised to the human population as a whole or whether it is a phenomenon 
limited to those who suffer from Rabies. This limitation also led Laycock to fail to 
connect his theory to possible voluntary actions (such as instinctively reaching to 
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flick on a light switch after simply imagining the room becoming lighter) and instead 
he regarded the responses as purely cerebral reflex actions due to the fact that 
hydrophobic individuals have no control over any of their actions (Stock & Stock, 
2004).  
 
Laycock’s original research was developed by Carpenter (1852) who did not study 
hydrophobic individuals, which provides some evidence for the ecological validity of 
Laycock’s original theory. Carpenter’s theory of ideomotor action was spawned from 
his research into the potential psychological explanations of the popular occult 
phenomena of his time, such as Table Turning and ‘the Magical Pendulum’ (Stock & 
Stock, 2004). Carpenter claimed that when an individual’s mind is occupied with the 
ideas that have been suggested to them, their body is influenced by them to such an 
extent that their actions appear to be out of their control. He went on to state that, 
unlike what many enthusiasts and operators of these popular phenomena asserted 
to be true, the individuals’ actions are not under the control of another being but that 
they are entirely directed by the ideas placed in their minds, without the individual 
even being aware of it (Carpenter, 1852). This led Carpenter to devise the term 
‘ideomotor’ as the ‘motor’ activity results from the incentive of dominant ‘ideas’ 
(James, 1890).   
 
Carpenter’s theory about the underlying psychological causes of these paranormal 
phenomena were supported by Faraday (1853) who attempted to discover the cause 
of the table’s movements within the phenomenon of ‘table turning’. In order to 
discover whether the source of the movements was indeed the ‘sitters’ (the subjects 
who sat around the table and who were given the suggestions of how the table 
would move) as he supposed, Faraday attached five sheets of card to each other 
with a small amount of adhesive (that would still allow the sheets to slide over one 
another) and adhered these to the table top. Each sheet of card was slightly bigger 
than the one below which allowed a mark to be drawn across the underside of each 
sheet, marking its’ original position. Faraday determined that if the table was the 
cause of the movements, it would move first and would drag the sheets of card with 
it from bottom to top resulting in the marked line sloping outwards in the opposite 
direction of the table’s movements. However, if the “sitter” was the origin of the 
table’s movements, the top sheet of card would move first, followed by the other 
sheets and then the table. This would be shown by the line on the underside of the 
sheets of card sloping in the same direction as the movements.  As he expected, 
Faraday found that the cause of the table’s movements were, in fact, the sitters’ own 
actions of pushing the table with their fingers, in the anticipated direction (Hyman, 
1999).  
 
Faraday’s findings show support for Carpenter’s theory of ideomotor action as, 
despite the cause of the table’s movements being found to be the sitters’ own 
actions; they themselves were unaware that they had been pushing the table in the 
expected direction (Faraday, 1853). This suggests that a simple idea such as “the 
table will begin to move to the left” alone, is enough to cause an individual to 
unconsciously direct their actions towards achieving the desired outcome by pushing 
the table to the left. Despite the support of Faraday, Carpenter’s theory is, like 
Laycock’s, limited in the sense that it focuses solely on Occult phenomena, just as 
Laycock’s original research was limited to Hydrophobia patients. These limitations 
could lead to ideomotor actions mistakenly being categorised as being unintentional 
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as neither Laycock or Carpenter have attempted to account for voluntary actions 
being triggered automatically from an idea. 
 
The work of Carpenter does however provide some insight into the potential link 
between an experience of ideomotor action and the effects of hypnotic suggestion. 
This can be seen in the fact that he investigated occult phenomena such as the 
‘magical pendulum’ which is a test used to detect a person’s suggestibility. The 
pendulum illusion was developed by Chevreul (1833) who found that a simple 
pendulum suspended by from a person’s finger tips would, when a person simply 
imagined it moving, begin to oscillate in the direction specified by the investigator. 
The individuals who carried out this task were unaware that the sole cause of the 
pendulum’s movements were their own imperceptible muscular movements and 
instead believed that the pendulum acted of its own accord (Easton & Shor, 1975).  
 
James (1890) was the first to develop a combined theory of ideomotor action which 
drew upon the ideas of Laycock and Carpenter, as well as the German theorists 
such as Herbart (1825). James adopted Carpenter’s term ‘ideomotor’ for his theory 
as he agreed that it combined the elements of the theory “the driving force of the 
dominant idea and the resulting motor activity” (Spitz, 1997) effectively. He did not 
however agree with Carpenter on his idea that ideomotor theory can only be applied 
to situations where a person’s free-will is limited, such as within occult settings. 
James (1890) made the connection between ideomotor theory and voluntary action, 
stating that all actions that we carry out every day should be considered as being 
ideomotor actions (James, 1890). An example of James’ ideomotor theory of 
voluntary action could be the flicking on of a light switch when we enter a dimly lit 
room. We instinctively reach for the light switch without having to actively think about 
what we are doing, the idea of wanting the room to become lighter is, in itself, 
enough to trigger the necessary actions required to achieve this goal.  
 
Evidence for James’ theory of ideomotor action has been found in recent brain 
imaging studies which have shown that merely imagining an action can lead to 
activation of the areas of the motor cortex associated with action implementation. 
One such study was carried out by Wagner et al (2011) who found that smokers 
showed greater activity in left anterior intraparietal sulcus and inferior frontal gyrus, 
both of which are brain regions involved in the activation of contralateral hand 
gestures (e.g. raising a cigarette to your mouth), when they watch scenes of a 
person smoking (Wagner, Dal Cin, Sargent, Kelley & Heatherton, 2011). Further 
evidence for this theory has been found in a study by Jacobson (1929) who 
discovered evidence of ‘action currents’ in participants’ arms when they were 
instructed to imagine they were bending it but told explicitly not to bend it. These 
currents remained for the duration that the participant imagined making the 
movement and terminated as soon as they stopped imagining the movement 
(Jacobson, 1929 as cited in Eysenck, 1943).  
 
Brass et al also attempted to test this link between movement observation and 
movement execution through the use of a stimulus-response paradigm (Brass, 
Bekkering, Wohlschläger & Prinz, 2000). Their study was based on the premise set 
out by Greenwald (1970) that a mental response image is used to mediate action 
control in that when a perceived event is similar to a known response image, the 
perception of the event should alone, activate the response (Brass et al, 2000). 
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Brass et al (2000) found that when a stimulus had a high degree of ideomotor 
compatibility (that is, it relates well to a known response image) it profoundly 
decreased the participants’ response times. However, this does not mean that they 
made fewer mistakes, Brass et al also found that when a stimulus was compatible 
with a response image (the stimulus displayed was the same as the expected 
response action) the correct response was activated, whereas when a stimulus was 
incompatible with the response image (the stimulus displayed was not the same as 
the expected response action), the participant’s displayed an interference effect and 
the incorrect response was activated (Brass et al, 2000).   
 
The above experimental evidence would therefore suggest that it is the idea of 
carrying out an action oneself and the action’s learned sensory consequences that 
creates the action pattern needed to achieve our desired goals (Koch & Kunde, 
2002). For this to occur, the outcomes of certain actions must have already been 
learned, if they have not previously been learned, the body cannot follow the mind’s 
ideas of consequences to produce a habitual, unconscious action (Baars, 1992). An 
idea alone has no ability to generate an action unless there are substantial 
physiological connections between actions and outcomes formed “as a consequence 
of use” (Thorndike, 1912).   
 
James’ theory also attempted to explain why not all of our ideas of actions result in 
us actually carrying them out. James suggested that an action will follow 
“unhesitatingly and immediately” (James, 1890) from an idea of it in the mind, unless 
it meets with opposition from another conscious thought in which case the inhibitory 
ideas would prevent each other from being carried out (Baars, 1992, Stock & Stock, 
2004).  This could be also used to explain why some people are more susceptible to 
hypnosis than others, as many hypnosis techniques require ideomotor action in 
order for them to take effect. Using James’ ideomotor theory (1890), it can be 
suggested that some individuals are more susceptible to hypnotic suggestions than 
others as they are unable to counter the ideomotor action effects with inhibitory ideas. 
On the other hand, those who are less susceptible to hypnotic suggestions are able 
to inhibit the suggested actions and thus reduce the ideomotor action effects. If an 
individual is not suggestible, they would likely inhibit the ‘suggestion idea’ with one of 
their own, such as “I don’t want to do that” whereas, in a highly suggestible individual, 
this inhibitory idea would not be present and thus the ideomotor action effect is 
allowed to take place.   
 
In order to test this hypothesis, the current study, investigated the relationship 
between hypnotic suggestibility and ideomotor action by using a series of hypnotic 
suggestibility tests and two ideomotor action tasks: a Brass finger-release task and a 
‘forward/inverse action-planning’ task. It could be suggested that people who are 
highly susceptible to hypnotic suggestion will experience ideomotor action effects 
more often in their everyday lives than those with low susceptibility. This is likely to 
be due to the fact that both hypnotic suggestion and ideomotor action require a 
person to engage in behaviours simply by thinking about them. It is predicted that 
people who are more susceptible to hypnotic suggestion will complete the 
compatible Brass task trials and the inverse action planning (ideomotor) scenarios 
faster than those who are not as susceptible.  
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An individual’s ability to engage in ideomotor action in the action-planning task was 
tested by asking the participants to respond to unambiguous everyday scenarios. 
These scenarios were either formed in a way that follows the same process as 
ideomotor action or in a way that is the opposite. The ‘ideomotor scenarios’ were 
known as inverse action planning: as the individual has to work backwards from a 
goal to an action, and determine whether the action would have achieved the desired 
goal. Whereas the non-ideomotor scenarios, known as forward action planning 
scenarios, required the individual to work forwards from an action and determine 
whether the outcome would follow from the action. It would follow therefore, that a 
person who often experiences ideomotor action in their everyday lives, would find it 
easier to answer the inverse action planning scenarios than someone who was not 
as accustomed to using ideomotor action in their lives and would therefore complete 
these scenarios much faster.  
 
This study also tested an individual’s ability to engage in ideomotor action using a 
stimulus-response task as outlined by Brass, Bekkering & Prinz (2001). In this 
measure, a key release action carried out by the participant was controlled by a 
visual representation of a movement (Brass et al, 2000). The stimuli used in this 
study were digitised images of a hand presented on a screen which were designed 
in such a way that they resembled the participants’ hand as the participant would see 
it, as closely as was possible. It is predicted that participants who are utilising 
ideomotor action should respond much faster to stimuli that are compatible to a 
learned response than those that are incompatible. This prediction is based on the 
idea that when presented with an image of a pre-determined response, the 
ideomotor effect would create the necessary action required to complete this 
response almost immediately after having seen it without the individual having to be 
consciously aware of it.  It is therefore predicted that those participants who are more 
susceptible to hypnotic suggestion will be less likely to inhibit ideomotor action 
effects, and will be faster at completing the ideomotor tasks than those participants 
who are less suggestible. This means that they should exhibit faster response times 
within the compatible Brass trials as well as the inverse action planning trials than 
those participants who are less susceptible to hypnotic suggestion. 
 
Method 
Participants 
36 participants took part in this study, 24 of whom were undergraduate psychology 
students who participated as part of a course requirement and were recruited 
through voluntary sign-ups on the University of Plymouth Participant Pool. Those 
participants who were not undergraduates in psychology were known to the 
researchers and were recruited without being offered any sort of reward for 
completing the experiment. In total there were 15 males and 21 females. 
Materials 
The instructions for the HIP Eye-Roll test were given to each researcher on a printed 
sheet which consisted of the instructions to read to the participant and the scale 
which was to be used to measure their susceptibility in the Eye-Roll test (see 
appendix A). The personality questionnaire for the HIP was also provided on a 
printed sheet along with a response sheet for each of the participants (see appendix 
B). 
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The instructions for the other hypnosis tests (Head-Roll and Balloon vs. Bucket of 
Stones) were provided by a trained hypnotherapist in MP3 format which were then 
played to the participants through the program Windows Media Player (version 12). 
The scales used to measure participants’ susceptibility to these tests were given to 
the researcher on printed sheets (see appendix C (Head-Roll) and appendix D 
(Balloon vs. Bucket of Stones)) 
The Brass Task and Action-Planning computer-based tasked were carried out on a 
HP Pavilion DV6-2114sa laptop computer or an Asus U35-JC laptop computer both 
running Windows 7. They were created and presented on a program called 
Presentation (version 15.0) (a stimulus delivery and experimental control program) 
that was downloaded from 
http://www.neurobs.com/menu_presentation/menu_download/current.  The stimuli 
used for these tasks are available in Appendix E (Brass Task) and Appendix F 
(Action Planning). 
Procedure 
This study employed a within-participants design in which all participants were 
exposed to the same measures, in the same order and in the same setting. Upon 
arrival at the experiment, participants were provided with a brief which explained the 
details of the research and informed them of their right to withdraw. Once they had 
read and agreed to the terms set out in the brief, they were asked to sign a consent 
form before the experiment commenced.  
In the first stage of this experiment, participants were asked to complete a variety of 
hypnosis tests in order to measure their hypnotic suggestibility. The first of these 
tests was the Hypnotic Induction Profile (HIP) (Spiegel, 1974) which consisted of an 
Eye-Roll test and then a personality questionnaire.  During this test the participant 
was asked by the researcher to sit with their head facing forward and, whilst holding 
their head in that position, to begin to look upwards towards their eyebrows and then 
to continue looking upwards, towards the top of their head (up-gaze). Once they had 
completed this they were asked to slowly close their eyes whilst continuing to look 
upwards (eye-roll).  The participants’ scores for this test were then measured on a 
five-point pictorial scale ranging from 0-4 (Spiegel, 1972) (see appendix A) by 
measuring (by eye) the amount of sclera (white of the eye) that was visible between 
the lower eyelid and the bottom of the iris.  
Once the eye-roll stage of the HIP had been completed, the participants were read 
the Apollonian-Odyssean-Dionysian Personality Inventory (Spiegel, 1977) 
questionnaire by the researcher (see appendix B). Their personality was measured 
in terms of spatial awareness; perception of time; and myth-belief constellation. The 
participant’s responses to the points on the questionnaire were scored as either 
Apollonian (A); Odyssean (O); or Dionysian (D) and were used to determine which of 
the three groups the participant belonged to: a highly hypnotizable individual falls 
within the Dionysian group and would have a high score (4-5) on the HIP whereas a 
person who does not respond well to hypnotic suggestion would likely belong to the 
Apollonian group and would show a low score on the HIP (1-2) people who were 
only mildly responsive to hypnotic suggestion were classified as Odyssean and 
would typically score around 3 on the HIP (mid-range).  
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Following this, the participants undertook a Head-Roll measure which was taken 
from the Harvard Group Test for Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGTHS) (Shor & Orne, 
1962). The participant was asked to sit up straight with their head facing forward, 
and to close their eyes and relax. They were then given the suggestions that their 
head would begin to fall forwards until it hung limply on their neck. Once the 
participant had received the full suggestion, they were asked to sit up again and 
open their eyes. The participants’ response to this test was measured during the test 
by comparing the angle at which their head dropped as a result of the suggestion 
techniques. Their scores for this part of the test were scored on a five-point scale 
(based on Spiegel’s eye roll scale) which ranged from 0 (no response) to 4 (extreme 
response) (see appendix C).  
Finally the participants were asked to complete a ‘Balloon vs. Bucket of Stones’ task, 
in which they were instructed to stand with their feet shoulder width apart with their 
arms at shoulder height and to close their eyes.  They were then told to imagine that 
they were holding a ‘big metal bucket’ in their dominant hand and that their other 
hand was tied to a helium balloon. The participants were given the suggestion that 
their dominant arm was becoming heavy through being asked to imagine that the 
bucket was being filled with ‘large, heavy stones’ as well as the suggestion that their 
other arm was getting lighter by asking them to imagine that their arm was being 
pulled up by the balloon. Once a sufficient response was elicited, the participants 
were asked to open their eyes. Their response to the test was once again measured 
on a five-point pictorial scale ranging from 0 to 4 (see appendix D).  
The participants received the instructions for the Head-Roll and Balloon vs. Bucket of 
Stones tests by means of a voice recording provided by a trained hypnotherapist 
(please refer to appendix I (disk)); this ensured that all participants received the 
instruction in the same way and in the appropriate manner to elicit a response in 
highly suggestible individuals.  In addition, a researcher was present at all times to 
offer any assistance that the participant required as well as to observe and record 
the participants’ responses to the tasks. At no point were the participants induced 
into full hypnosis.  
Following their completion of the hypnotic tasks, participants moved on to the second 
stage of the experiment in which they were asked to complete two computer-based 
tasks. The first of these tasks was a response-time task involving a finger-press 
measure. To complete this, the participant placed their index and middle fingers on 
the ‘H’ and ‘J’ keys of a computer keyboard and were asked to look at a computer 
screen upon which pictures of a hand were shown in succession as well as a written 
instruction for an action (lift index finger when you see a 1 or lift middle finger when 
you see a 2). In some of the trials the hand was carrying out the same action as the 
instruction dictated, in others it was doing the opposite. In each trial, the participant 
viewed a neutral photograph of a hand (all fingers down) for 800ms and then a 
response photograph (with either middle or index finger lifted up) with a response 
cue number (1 for index, 2 for middle) shown above the photograph, these were 
displayed for 2700ms or until participant made a response. There were 120 trials of 
randomly presented response stimuli, of which there were an equal number for each 
possible response, once the participant had completed this task, the average 
response time for the task was recorded by the researcher. 
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The final task that participants carried out was also a computer-based task 
investigating their action-planning preference: whether they are faster at responding 
to inverse or forward-action planning scenarios.  This task was set out in an ABAB 
pattern in which the participant first performed a forward-action planning block (A) of 
26 trials before moving on to an inverse-action planning block (B) for 20 trials before 
repeating the pattern. In the forward-action planning section, the participants were 
first presented with an ‘action’ and had to then decide whether the subsequently 
presented outcome could be attained by carrying out this action or not by pressing 
the ‘Z’ key if it would, and ‘M’ if it would not. In the inverse-action planning section, 
the participants were presented first with a ‘goal’ and had to then decide whether the 
subsequently presented ‘action’ was suitable to achieve this goal or not by again 
pressing the relevant keys. Each trial of this task was presented in the same way: 
there was a fixation cross displayed for 500ms followed by a black screen (also 
displayed for 500ms). Following this, the participants were shown the first line of the 
scenario for 1200ms and then the second line also for 1200ms (this line either 
displayed an ‘action’ (forward action planning) or a ‘goal’ (inverse action planning). 
This was then replaced by a third line of text (either an outcome (forward) or an 
action (inverse) which remained on the screen for a maximum of 2600ms or until the 
participant made a response. This measure was used to establish whether a 
participant found it easier to engage in inverse-action planning over forward-action 
planning by monitoring the condition in which they made faster decisions.   
Once the participants had completed these tasks they were debriefed by the 
researcher and were also given a printed handout of the debrief which contained the 
contact details for both researchers as well as the principle investigator. The 
participants were once again reminded of their right to withdraw and were informed 
that if they had, at any point, any questions about the research or if they wanted their 
data removed from the study, they should not hesitate to contact one of the people 
listed on their debrief. Copies of the brief and debrief are given in appendix G and 
appendix H respectively. 
After all the data had been collected, they were entered into a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet document. At this stage, any participants who displayed an error rate of 
above 15% on either the Brass task or the action-planning task had their data 
removed as it would indicate that they were not paying full attention to the task or 
they had not taken the experiment seriously. In order to determine whether a 
participant was faster in the forward or inverse action planning scenarios, the 
remaining participants’ scores for the inverse planning task were subtracted from 
their scores for the forward planning task. In this way, a positive number indicated 
that they were faster in inverse planning trials whereas a negative number indicated 
that they were faster in forwards planning trials. In order to determine whether a 
participant was faster in the compatible trials or the incompatible trials in the Brass 
task, their score for the compatible trials was subtracted from their score for the 
incompatible trials. In this way, as with the action planning, a positive score meant 
that they were faster in the compatible trials than in the incompatible trials. 
The results of the remaining participants were then subjected to a z-ratio analysis in 
order to standardise the scores to account for variability in results that could have 
arisen from individual differences, testing location and experimenter differences. 
These standardised scores were then used to carry out Pearson correlational 
analyses in order to determine the strength of the relationship, if any, between the 
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measures of hypnotic suggestibility and ideomotor action. Following this, as HIP has 
been shown not to correlate well with other measures of hypnotisability, all 
participants’ scores for the HIP were removed and the remaining data were re-
analysed as outlined above.  
Two-tailed repeated measures t-tests were also carried out to see whether there was 
a significant difference between participants’ response times in the two action-
planning conditions and also to see whether there was a difference in the time taken 
to complete compatible trials and incompatible trials of the Brass task. 
 
Results 
The mean and standard deviation for the time taken to complete the two action-
planning conditions are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Mean and standard deviation for forward and inverse action planning scores 
 
                                                                 M                                       SD 
Forward action planning                        889.63                               186.57 
Inverse action planning                         931.40                               189.31 
 
The results in Table 1 show that on average, participants were faster at forward 
action planning than inverse action planning. A two-tailed repeated measure t-test 
revealed this difference to be significant (t (25) = 2.81, p = .009). 
 
Table 2: Mean and standard deviation for compatible and incompatible Brass Task scores 
 
                                        M                                      SD 
Compatible                                           409.87                                48.45 
Incompatible                                         464.69                                63.65 
 
The results in Table 2 show that participants were also faster in the compatible trials 
of the Brass task than they were in the incompatible trials. A two-tailed repeated 
measures t-test revealed that this difference was also significant (t(25) = 8.94, p 
<.001). 
 
 
Table 3: Cross-correlations between tasks (HIP included) 
 
                                                                          r 
Brass/action                                                    .37 
Brass/hypnosis                                               .34 
Action/hypnosis                                              .24 
  
From the above table it can be seen that all correlations show a positive relationship 
which indicates that the effect of hypnotic suggestibility on the ability to engage in 
ideomotor action was in the direction predicted.  
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Figure 1: Scatterplot showing the relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and 
participants’ Brass task score (n = 27) 
 
The data in figure 1 show a linear positive relationship. A Pearson correlation 
showed this relationship to be statistically significant, r = +.34, n = 27, p < .05, one-
tailed. 
 
 
Figure 2: Scatterplot showing the relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and 
participants’ action planning scores (n = 27 
. 
The data in figure 2 also show a general linear positive relationship, a further 
Pearson correlation did not however reveal this relationship to be statistically 
significant, r = +.24, n = 27, p =.114, one-tailed. 
 
Table 4 shows the correlations between the measures after the scores for the HIP 
were removed from the analysis. 
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Table 4: Cross-correlations between tasks (HIP removed) 
 
                                                                          r 
Brass/action                                                    .37 
Brass/hypnosis                                               .37 
Action/hypnosis                                              .35 
 
From the above table, one can see that by removing the HIP from the analysis, the 
correlations between the measures have improved somewhat and that the 
relationships still appear to be in the predicted direction. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Scatterplot showing the relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and 
participants’ scores for the Brass task, with HIP scores removed (n=27) 
 
Figure 3 shows that even with HIP scores removed from analysis; there remains a 
linear positive relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and participants’ Brass 
task performance. A Pearson correlation revealed this relationship to be statistically 
significant, r = +.37, n = 27, p < .05, one-tailed. 
 
Figure 4 shows that there is still a linear positive relationship between hypnotic 
suggestibility and action planning and a Pearson correlation showed that without HIP, 
this relationship is statistically significant, r = +.35, n = 27, p <.05, one-tailed. 
The relationship between standardised action planning and Brass task performance 
scores also showed a positive relationship and a Pearson correlation revealed that 
this relationship was significant, r = +.37, n = 27, p <.05, one-tailed. This relationship 
would indicate that the action planning task is an appropriate measure of an 
individual’s propensity to engage in ideomotor action as it shows a significant 
correlation with an existing measure. This linear positive relationship is shown in 
Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 4: Scatterplot showing the relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and 
participants’ action planning scores with HIP removed.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Scatterplot showing the relationship between a participants’ Brass task scores and 
action planning scores. 
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Discussion 
The relationship between a person’s hypnotic suggestibility and their likelihood to 
engage in ideomotor action was shown to support the hypothesis that the more 
suggestible a person is, the faster they will complete tasks that have a high 
ideomotor action compatibility, such as the compatible trials of the Brass task and 
the inverse action planning trials of the action planning task.  There were significant 
positive correlations found between a person’s hypnotic suggestibility and their 
scores for the Brass task both with HIP scores included in and excluded from the 
analysis. This supports the previous findings of Brass et al (2000) that people 
perform faster in ideomotor compatible trials than they do in incompatible trials. 
However, a significant relationship between the participants’ scores action-planning 
tasks and their hypnotic suggestibility was only found when the HIP scores were 
removed from the analysis. This could be explained using the findings of previous 
research which has shown that the Eye-Roll test of the HIP does not correlate 
strongly with other measures of hypnotic susceptibility (Orne et al, 1979), this 
research found that when the hypnotic induction factor of the HIP was removed from 
analysis, the eye-roll test only presented a correlation of .08 which suggests that the 
eye-roll test is not a valid measure of hypnotic suggestibility (Orne et al, 1979). 
 
With the removal of the HIP from the analysis, a significant relationship was found 
between hypnotic suggestibility and standardised action-planning scores which 
affords support for the experimental hypothesis as it suggests that people that score 
more highly on hypnotic suggestibility scales complete inverse action planning tasks 
faster than those who are not as highly suggestible and faster than forward action 
planning tasks.  A reason for this effect could be that inverse action planning tasks 
follow the same principles as ideomotor action in that it is the imagined end goal that 
elicits an action that is appropriate for attaining this goal. Highly suggestible people 
that are adept at utilising ideomotor action in their daily lives should be able to use 
the presented goal within the inverse action planning scenarios to mentally perform 
the action needed to attain this goal, and thus respond faster than those individuals 
that do not usually experience ideomotor action effects. 
 
The findings outlined above would indicate that individuals that are more highly 
suggestible to hypnosis are more likely to be able to engage in ideomotor action than 
those who are not as highly suggestible. Yet, from the results found in this study, it is 
not possible to determine the direction of this relationship: it cannot be concluded 
whether a person is more hypnotisable because they engage more readily in 
ideomotor action or whether they engage in ideomotor action more readily because 
they are more suggestible. Further research into this field could attempt to overcome 
this by using ideomotor action tasks in an attempt to make people more susceptible 
to hypnotic suggestion. If it is possible to make people more suggestible by training 
them to use ideomotor action, it could then be suggested that it is an ability to 
engage in ideomotor action that causes some people to be more hypnotisable than 
others and not hypnotic suggestibility that leads to a person being more likely to 
utilise ideomotor action in their daily lives. 
 
Despite the significant relationships found between hypnotic suggestibility and 
ideomotor action, it could be argued that the hypnotic suggestibility tests utilised by 
this study may not be a valid measure of suggestibility. This can be seen in the fact 
that the measures used were only improvised measures that have not previously 
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been tested on an experimental level with existing measures of suggestibility to 
ensure that they do measure what they intend to measure. Future research should 
attempt to counter this limitation by testing suggestibility using standardised 
measures of suggestibility such as the Carleton University Responsiveness to 
Suggestion Scale (CURSS) (Spanos, Radtke, Hodgins, Bertrand, & Stam, 1981) or 
the Harvard Group Measure of Hypnotic Suggestibility (Shor & Orne, 1962). If a 
relationship between suggestibility and ideomotor action measures is still present, it 
would serve to provide more substantial support for the findings of the current study. 
However, the standardised measures of suggestibility recommended are not without 
their own limitations, for example they contain large volumes of items that are not 
related to ideomotor suggestion which could prevent a significant relationship from 
being detected. 
 
It could also be argued that the hypnotic suggestibility scores for the participants 
may not have been an accurate measure of the individuals’ suggestibility as they 
were not collected by trained hypnotherapists (although the audio files used were). 
Therefore, future research should attempt to have the data for the suggestibility 
measure be collected by someone that is trained in hypnotherapy so that they can 
more accurately recognise the level of response exhibited by participants and 
therefore provide a more accurate understanding of each participant’s hypnotic 
suggestibility.  
 
Another potential limitation of the hypnosis measures used in this study is that the 
tasks were very long (ranging from three to nine minutes in duration). This meant 
that many of the participants found it hard to remain focused on the tasks (in 
particular the Balloon vs. Bucket of Stones measure) for the duration. In this case, 
the response that the task elicited in the participants may not have been indicative of 
their actual suggestibility. On one particular occasion during the Balloon vs. Bucket 
of stones, a participant was observed lowering their arms, stretching and then once 
again placing their arms in their original position. This would indicate that in order to 
obtain a true indication of an individual’s hypnotic suggestibility, future research 
should ensure that the measures of suggestibility used do not require a participant to 
stand or sit in an uncomfortable position for a long period of time as this could cause 
them to lose focus on the task and could therefore result in inaccurate recordings of 
their suggestibility. A delayed re-test could also be carried out which would highlight 
any obvious differences between participants’ scores in the initial test and their 
scores on the re-test. This would allow the investigator to determine which 
participants may not have been paying full attention to the task in the initial tests and 
thus their data can be removed from the analysis so that it does not affect the 
significance of any relationship found between measures.  
 
It was also found that in general, participants performed significantly faster in forward 
action planning scenarios within the action planning task than they did in inverse 
action planning tasks. This was expected to be the case as it should be easier, in 
general, for people to imagine an action’s consequences than it would be to 
determine what actions need to be carried out to achieve a certain goal. However, 
this effect could be due to the fact that the sentences used within the forward action 
planning scenarios were shorter than those used in the inverse scenarios and thus it 
would take people less time to read them and as a result their response times will be 
lower. To overcome this limitation, future research should attempt to use scenarios 
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of a stipulated length for both forward and inverse scenarios, in this way there should 
be no confounding variable in the form of reading time to account for the differing 
response times between conditions. 
 
The action planning test used in this study did however support previous findings 
that there are two distinct methods of action planning: forward and inverse. Previous 
research has found that within the central nervous system (CNS), there are neural 
circuits called ‘internal models’ which simulate aspects of the sensorimotor system. 
Through computational studies, it was found that there were two distinct methods of 
action control: forward methods that enable a person to determine the causal 
relationship between actions and their sensory consequences; and inverse methods 
which are the opposite and enable a person to determine which actions are needed 
to achieve desired outcomes (Wolpert, Doya & Kawato, 2003). However, the current 
study is one of the first to have successfully shown, on an experimental basis, that 
individuals differ in their preference for using either of the two models and thus have 
their own ‘action planning style’.  
 
One further potential limitation of this study could be that a relatively small sample 
was used to provide the data. Future research should attempt to carry out this 
research using a much larger sample that covers a wider range of the population 
than was possible within this study. This would provide results that are more 
indicative of the general population and improve the ecological validity of the results 
found in the current study. The small sample size could also account for the 
relatively low correlations found in this study; a larger sample size with a wider range 
of scores could result in higher correlations being found between the measure of 
hypnotic suggestibility and ideomotor action.  
 
Future research could also attempt to show a relationship between hypnotic 
suggestibility and ideomotor action by using neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI. 
By using these techniques, any overlap between brain regions activated during 
hypnosis and those engaged in ideomotor action could be highlighted. This would 
lend additional support to the results of this study and would show a biological basis 
for the relationship between a person’s hypnotic suggestibility and their ability to 
engage in ideomotor action. 
 
The current research has important implications for understanding why some people 
are more suggestible than others. The results of this study suggest that those who 
are more suggestible to hypnosis are less able to inhibit ideomotor action effects and 
that this is the reason why they respond more effectively to hypnotic suggestion. This 
research has also opened up several avenues for future research which would 
further explore the relationship between suggestibility and ideomotor action. 
However, from the information available at present, it is reasonable to suggest that 
highly hypnotisable individuals are much more likely to be able to engage in 
ideomotor action than those who are less hypnotisable and that this enables them to 
complete ideomotor compatible tasks more quickly than their non-suggestible 
counterparts. 
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